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I. Legislative and Regulatory Developments
This year’s developments included the State of Oklahoma creating the
Emission Reduction Technology Incentive Act, and the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission adopting final versions of several rules, including
new allowables for gas wells.
A. State Legislative Developments
1. Commission May Permit Well Drilling Pending Orders
House Bill 3039 relating to common source of supply and well spacing
and drilling units and allowing the drilling of wells prior to the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission granting certain orders was enacted on May 20,
2022. It amends 52 O.S. Section 87.1 to provide that the Commission may
issue a permit to drill any well for which notice and hearing have occurred
for a special order or an order on the merits in any type of case prior to the
issuance of any such order. A final order from the Commission is required
prior to drilling any well that falls within one (1) mile of the boundary of an
underground storage facility except in cases where the underground storage
operator does not object.1
2. Oklahoma Emission Reduction Technology Incentive Act and
Additional Tax Incentives
House Bill 3568, enacted May 26, 2022 and effective July 1, 2022,
creates the Oklahoma Emission Reduction Technology Incentive Act to be
codified at 68 O.S. Section 55006 et seq. The Act creates a rebate program
through July 1, 2027 for a rebate in the amount of up to twenty-five percent
(25%) of documented expenditures directly attributable to the
implementation of a qualified Emission Reduction Project. The rebate
program will be administered by the Department of Environmental Quality
and the Oklahoma Tax Commission.
HB 3568 amends 68 O.S. Section 1001 to provide for a gross production
tax exemption for a period not to exceed five (5) years for secondary and
tertiary recovery projects approved or having an initial project start date on
or after July 1, 2022 and for wells drilled which are completed with the use
of recycled water on or after July 1, 2022 from the date of first sales for a
period of twenty-four (24) months, proportionate to the percentage of the
total amount of water used to complete the well that is recycled water. The
exemptions shall be administered as a refund to be claimed after the end of
1. 2022 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 289 (H.B. 3039) (West).
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the fiscal year. The amount of refunds is capped and will be proportionate if
required to avoid exceeding the maximum amounts authorized for refunds.
HB 3568 also amends 68 O.S. Section 1001.3 to provide for a partial
exception from gross production tax as a tax refund for economically at-risk
oil or gas leases, defined as any lease with one or more producing wells
with an average production volume per well of ten (10) barrels of oil or
sixty (60) MCF or less of natural gas per day operated at a net loss or at a
net profit which is less than the total gross production tax for such lease
during the previous calendar year, and the gross value of the oil falls below
Fifty Dollars ($50) per barrel, on an average monthly basis, and the price of
gas falls below Three Dollars and fifty cents ($3.50) per MMBtu, on an
average monthly basis. Again, the total amount of refunds is capped and
will be proportionate if required to avoid exceeding the maximum amounts
authorized for refunds.2
B. State Regulatory Developments
1. Oil & Gas Conservation Rule Updates
On September 1, 2021, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
published various permanent final adoptions of rules, to be effective
October 1, 2021, including: rules to modify allowables for horizontal gas
wells, extend the time period to submit initial test results for gas wells to
sixty (60) days after the date of first sales of gas, reduce the frequency of
gas well tests, and clarify permitted rates of production for unallocated gas
wells.3
2. Production Rates for Unallocated Gas Wells
On March 3, 2022, by Order No. 723929, in Cause CD No. 202102956,
the Oklahoma Corporation Commission entered an order regarding the
maximum permitted rates of production for unallocated natural gas wells.
The order establishes a proration formula for the period between April 1,
2022 through March 31, 2023 at seventy-five percent (75%) of wellhead
calculated absolute open flow potential or 3,000 mcf/d, whichever is
greater.4

2. 2022 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 346 (H.B. 3568) (West).
3. 38 Okla. Reg 1739 (Sept. 1, 2021).
4. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, Cause CD No. 202102956, Order No. 723929 (Mar. 3, 2022).
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II. Judicial Developments
This year Oklahoma state courts examined the limits of local control
over oil and gas operations, and how an order from the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission can affect a joint operating agreement. Also, the
federal court for the Western District of Oklahoma explained when a
pipeline company can acquire property using eminent domain under the
Natural Gas Act.
A. Supreme Court Cases
Magnum Energy, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment for City of Norman, 2022
OK 26, 510 P.3d 818
How much authority does a municipality have to regulate oil and gas
activities? Magnum Energy, Inc. (“Magnum”) applied for a variance from
the Board of Adjustment for the City of Norman (“City”) for a variance
from the City’s requirement that oil and gas operators maintain $2 million
of umbrella liability coverage.5 The trial court granted summary judgment
for Magnum, holding the coverage requirement conflicted with State law;
however, the Court of Civil Appeals (“COCA”) reversed.6 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court held the requirement conflicts with 52 O.S. Supp. 2015
§ 137.1 (“137.1”), setting forth a municipality’s authority to regulate oil and
gas operations; therefore, the requirement is unenforceable.7
Magnum operates the Patty No. 1 well in Norman, Oklahoma, and on
January 2, 2018, it requested a waiver of the umbrella insurance
requirement. On January 24, 2018, City denied the waiver, and Magnum
appealed to the District Court of Cleveland County.8 That court granted
Magnum’s motion for summary judgment, while the COCA reversed,
holding the requirement was a valid exercise of City’s police power.9
The Oklahoma Supreme Court separated the issue into two parts: “(1)
what is the scope of municipal authority to regulate the production of oil
and gas, and (2) whether [the insurance requirement] falls within the scope
of that authority.”10

5. Magnum Energy, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment for City of Norman, 2022 OK 26, ¶ 1,
510 P.3d 818.
6. Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
7. Id. ¶ 0.
8. Id. ¶ 2.
9. Id. ¶ 3.
10. Id. ¶ 7.
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Magnum argued that 137.1 limits a municipality’s authority to regulate
oil and gas operations to three categories: (1) road use, traffic, noise, and
odors; (2) establishing setbacks and fencing requirements to protect health,
safety, and welfare; and (3) enact reasonable ordinances within a 100-year
floodplain to maintain flood insurance. Except for those three categories,
“all other regulations of oil and gas operations shall be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission.”11
City responded that 137.1 did not “comprise the full scope of authority to
regulate” oil and gas operations. City claimed it also had a general police
power to provide for the safety of its citizens, allowing it to enact
regulations that go beyond the categories noted above.12
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that when the State Legislature
enacted 137.1, it severely limited a municipality’s ability to regulate oil and
gas operations, instead conferring that authority on the Corporation
Commission.13 In doing so, the Court held City’s authority to regulate such
operations is limited to those areas specified in 137.1, and City’s umbrella
insurance requirement does not fall within those areas, rendering it
unenforceable.14
Crown Energy Company v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 511 P.3d 1064,
2022 OK 60
Does a general liability policy apply to damages allegedly caused by
waste water disposal wells? Crown Energy Company (“Crown”) operates
oil and gas wells in Payne County, Oklahoma. In 2015, Crown obtained
insurance from Mid-Continent Casualty Co. (“Mid-Continent”) to cover
those operations. The policy applies to bodily injury or property damage
caused by an occurrence, and it includes a Pollution Exclusion.15
In December 2016, a group of Payne County residents sued Crown and
other operators in a class action lawsuit, claiming the defendants’ waste
water disposal wells had caused seismic activity which damaged the
plaintiffs’ property (the “Reid Lawsuit”). Crown submitted a claim to MidContinent requesting defense and indemnity pursuant to the insurance
policy. Mid-Continent denied Crown’s request, claiming the damages were
not caused by an “occurrence” as defined in the policy, and citing the

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 20.
Crown Energy Co. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 2022 OK 60, ¶ 1, 511 P.3d 1064.
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Pollution Exclusion.16 Under the Exclusion, the policy does not apply to
bodily injury or property damage “arising out of the discharge…of smoke,
vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste
materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon the land,
the atmosphere or any water course or body of water[.]”17
Crown filed suit, and the trial court held Mid-Continent had a duty to
defend Crown in the Reid Lawsuit.18 The Court of Civil Appeals (“COCA”)
affirmed the trial court, ruling the Pollution Exclusion did not apply. The
COCA found the seismic activity was caused by the injection of waste
water into the disposal wells at high pressure, and the Pollution Exclusion
did not reference the injection of pollutants into the land “under pressure.”
Mid-Continent appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, claiming the
COCA’s emphasis on the pressure of the injection amounted to a “new and
independent theory of causation” and undermined the effect of the Pollution
Exclusion.19
The policy defines “occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.”
Mid-Continent argued Crown intentionally injected waste water into its
disposal wells, so the injection could not be considered an “accident.”20
The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected that argument, finding the
seismic activity itself was accidental because it is not a “natural and
probable consequence” of Crown’s activities. The seismic activity
constituted the occurrence as defined by the policy.21
In its second argument, Mid-Continent claimed the Pollution Exclusion
applied because the Reid Lawsuit concerned claims arising out of the
discharge of toxic liquids and waste materials, and the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission had identified waste water as a “deleterious
substance.”22
Crown countered the Pollution Exclusion is ambiguous as to whether it
applies to the claims arising out of seismic activity, and the court should
apply the “reasonable expectations doctrine” to determine whether the

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 13.
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applicability of the policy. Crown argued the pressure of the injection
caused the property damage, not the polluting nature of the waste water.23
After discussing past holdings, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found the
Pollution Exclusion to be ambiguous as to whether it applies to the claims
in the Reid Lawsuit. Since the court construes ambiguous provisions in
favor of the insured, it held Crown could have reasonably expected the
policy to cover the claims in the Reid Lawsuit, and affirmed the trial court’s
judgment.24
B. Appellate Activity
FourPoint Energy, LLC v. BCE-Mach II, LLC, 2021 OK CIV APP 46,
503 P.3d 435
When the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (the “Commission”)
issues a pooling order and designates an operator, who has the authority to
designate a successor operator – a court or only the Commission?
The Commission designated EnerVest Operating, LLC (“EnerVest”) as
operator of several wells subject to JOAs involving FourPoint Energy
(“Energy”), and some of those areas were also subject to force pooling
orders. In late 2019, BCE-Mach II, LLC (“BCE”) bought EnerVest’s
interest in those properties, including those subject to force pooling
orders.25
EnerVest has filed the paperwork to transfer operations to BCE, and the
Commission has designated BCE as the bonded operator of the pooled
wells. However, the Commission has yet to approve all of BCE’s
applications to amend the force pooling orders to designate BCE as
operator.26
Energy filed suit in 2020 in Beckham and Washita Counties, requesting
the district court declare them operator under the applicable JOAs, enjoin
BCE from operating the properties, and award monetary damages due to
BCE’s alleged breach of contract for failure to relinquish operations.27 The
trial court granted BCE’s motion to dismiss on all pooled properties, citing
the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction.28
23.
24.
25.
435.
26.
27.
28.

Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 25.
FourPoint Energy, LLC v. BCE-Mach II, LLC, 2021 OK CIV APP 46, ¶ 3, 503 P.3d
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6.
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The Court of Civil Appeals (“COCA”) upheld the trial court’s dismissal
of Energy’s claims for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief due to
the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, the COCA found
the trial court erred in dismissing Energy’s claim for breach of contract; the
court should have allowed Energy to amend its complaint to allege BCE
breached the JOA for reasons other than failure to turn over operations to
Energy.29
Energy argued when parties enter into private contracts, the District
Court should determine the parties’ respective rights and obligations. The
COCA disagreed, citing when the Commission has issued a force pooling
order, it has exclusive jurisdiction to designate an operator.30 “Though
JOAs, including ones with ‘successor operator provisions’ (like those at
issue here), are used to supplement forced pooling orders…private contract
provisions that purport to transfer Commission-conferred power cannot
alter a unit operator’s legal status.”31
Regarding Energy’s claim for breach of contract, the trial court ruled that
claim was not yet at issue because the Commission had not yet designated
BCE as operator. If the Commission did not designate BCE as operator
under the force pooling orders, then BCE could not have breached the
contract.32
The COCA reversed the trial court’s order in this respect, holding the
court does not need to wait for the Commission because the Commission’s
designation of an operator can be separated from Energy’s breach of
contract claim. Even if the Commission designates BCE as operator, BCE
could still be liable for damages under the JOA, and the question of liability
may not be determined by a motion to dismiss.33
C. Federal Cases
Kunneman Properties, LLC, et al. v. Marathon Oil Company, 2022 WL
1766925 (N.D. Okla. 2022)
What requirements does a plaintiff have to meet to certify a class action?
Kunneman Properties, LLC, et al. (“Kunneman”) own royalty interests in
wells operated by Marathon Oil Company (“Marathon”). Kunneman
claimed Marathon breached leases and underpaid royalties by improperly
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id.
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deducting costs of midstream services required to make the natural gas
marketable.34 This lead Kunneman to move for class certification pursuant
to Rule 23 of Federal Civil Procedure (“Rule 23”) for the following class:
(1) all mineral owners subject to a lease from August 7, 2012 under which
they received royalty attributable to Marathon’s interest in Oklahoma
properties; and (2) those royalty payments were reduced for costs for
marketing, gathering, compressing, dehydrating, treating, processing or
transporting the natural gas.35
Kunneman also offered a subclass: all owners subject to a lease with an
express provision stating, “royalty will be paid on gas used off the lease
premises (an Off-Lease-Use clause).”36 The proposed class includes 19,788
leases and 1,336 wells in 21 different counties in Oklahoma.37 Marathon
argued Kunneman did not meet Rule 23’s requirements of commonality,
typicality, adequacy, or predominance.
Regarding commonality, the court explained there must be “questions of
law or fact common to the class.”38 Will the resolution of the issue resolve
the issue for all class members? Kunneman argued Marathon breached the
implied duty of marketability and there is a common question as to at what
point gas becomes marketable.39
Kunneman broke the leases down into seven separate categories;
however, Marathon argued and the court found inconsistencies in
Kunneman’s categorization, including the same royalty payment language
found in leases in separate categories. Kunneman argued none of the lease
provisions eliminate the implied duty of marketability, making all of the
leases “the same.” The court disagreed, holding there are too many
variations of lease language within each category; therefore, Kunneman did
not satisfy the commonality requirement.40
Second, the court turned to the typicality requirement, or that the claims
of the class representative are typical of the claims of the entire class. Since
every claim is based on an alleged breaching of a lease, the court held
Kunneman satisfied the typicality requirement.41

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Kunneman Props., LLC v. Marathon Oil Co., 2022 WL 1766925 (N.D. Okla. 2022).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *5-9.
Id. at *9.
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Third, Kunneman must establish the class representative will “adequately
protect the interests of the class.” The court set forth a two-prong test: (1)
do the named plaintiffs have any conflicts with the remaining class
members, and (2) will the named plaintiffs prosecute the action “vigorously
on behalf of the class?”42
Marathon argued the named plaintiffs were inadequate because they did
not understand the litigation. The court disagreed, finding the named
plaintiffs understood why they thought Marathon breached their leases, read
the leases provisions and their royalty check stubs, and understood their
role as representatives of the class. Therefore, Kunneman satisfied the
adequacy requirement.43
Next, Kunneman sought class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3),
which requires the court to find the common questions of law predominate
over any other questions of law affecting only individual class members.44
After analyzing the leases, the court explained the proposed class
presents as many as 137 legal issues for the court to determine, and
adjudicating each issue would be unmanageable. Therefore, Kunneman did
not satisfy the predominance requirement.45
Finally, the court explained Kunneman must establish a class action is
superior to any other method of “fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.”46 Marathon argued individual class members want to control
the litigation because they have filed their own lawsuits against Marathon.
The court responded that those are only four lawsuits, so they do not defeat
the superiority of a class action.47
Ultimately, since Kunneman could not meet the requirements for
commonality and predominance, the court declined to certify the proposed
class or modify the class to certify a partial class. Due to the general
inaccuracies in Kunneman’s proposed categories of lease royalty payment
provisions, the court declined the motion for class certification.48

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at *10.
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *11-12.
Id. at *12.
Id.
Id. at *13.
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Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, LP v. Tarralbo, 2022 WL
386099, Util. L. Rep. P 15,208 (W.D. Okla. 2022)
Under what circumstances does the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) authorize
a pipeline company to use eminent domain to acquire property? Panhandle
Eastern Pipe Line Company, LP (“Panhandle”) operates a compressor
station in Kingfisher County pursuant to two certificates issued by FERC in
1979 and 1981, declaring the station “necessary and integral” to
Panhandle’s “ability to transport natural gas through its pipelines in
interstate commerce.”49
From 1979 through April 20, 2020, Panhandle leased the land from the
defendants (“Tarralbo”). After the lease expired, Tarralbo rejected several
offers by Panhandle to buy the property, leading Panhandle to ask the Court
to declare that § 717 of the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) authorizes it to use
eminent domain to acquire the property.50
The Court explained Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1 sets forth the
procedural aspects of NGA condemnation proceedings. Rule 71.1 describes
a two-step procedure: (1) determine whether the taking is proper; and (2)
determine just compensation.51
§ 717f(h) allows natural gas companies holding certificates of public
convenience and necessity to acquire real property through eminent
domain. The statute sets forth three requirements Panhandle must meet to
succeed in the action and establish this court has subject matter jurisdiction:
(1) holds the required certificate; (2) unable to agree on compensation to
acquire the property; and (3) the property value exceeds $3,000.52
The court explained Panhandle meets the first and third requirements, but
Tarralbo argued the second requirement has not been met because the lease
included a provision evidencing the parties’ agreement to extend the lease
to 2029. The court rejected the argument, explaining nothing in the lease
required an extension, and after the lease expired, Panhandle made several
unsuccessful attempts to purchase the property.53
Next, Tarralbo argued § 717f(h) limits the use of eminent domain to new
pipeline construction or equipment installation. Again, the court rejected
the argument, holding the statue authorizes eminent domain to acquire land
49. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., LP v. Tarralbo, 2022 WL 386099, Util. L. Rep. P
15,208 (W.D. Okla. 2022).
50. Id. at *1.
51. Id. at *2.
52. Id. at *3.
53. Id.
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necessary to operate and maintain pipelines, even if the pipeline system has
already been built. Having met all three requirements, the court held
Panhandle had the right to use eminent domain.54
Regarding just compensation, the court explained it can only appoint a
three-person commission and deny a jury trial in “exceptional cases.” The
court ordered the parties to submit briefs concerning whether “this is one of
those exceptional cases.”55

54. Id. at *4.
55. Id. at *5.
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